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An estimated 17.3 trillion stored rows across a wide range of Microsoft datasets were reachable through a single internal analytics service, all because it never checked the signature on a login token. That flaw let me claim an administrator’s identity and submit unauthorized SQL queries without any real credentials. I used only table descriptions, metadata, and bounded sample rows to understand the potential scope.
Two quick notes first. The impact I describe is hypothetical. It’s what an attacker could have done with this access, but luckily I found the bug instead, reported it, and never touched any customer data or PII. And for transparency: Microsoft had editorial control over this post, cutting sections and figures and reshaping how the impact is described before publication. Microsoft said the following about this finding:
“We appreciate the opportunity to investigate the findings reported by Faav. Their submission and coordinated vulnerability disclosure helped us to better protect our customers by hardening our services. We value and appreciate safe security research under the terms of the Microsoft Bug Bounty Program and look forward to continuing to work with Faav in the future.”
Hey! I’m Faav. A little over a year ago, when I was 15, I published Break into any Microsoft building: Leaking PII in Microsoft Guest Check-In, my first Microsoft write-up. I’m 16 now, and this one is a little bigger.
Since then I’ve gone all-in on bug bounty. I’ve spent the year hacking Microsoft off and on around school, and finding bugs across Amazon, Google, Adobe, and a bunch of other companies. I also started building AI into how I hunt, which led me to develop Antares, my personal AI hackbot.
This one started as an automated lead that Antares couldn’t finish. Ten days later, after a Friday of schoolwork and one late-night hunch, it turned into the biggest Microsoft bug I’d ever found.
On August 25, 2026, Antares identified an internal Microsoft service called Titan. Its web interface sat behind a VPN REQUIRED page for Microsoft employees, so the frontend was out of reach. But since when has a locked front door stopped anyone? The “VPN REQUIRED” page shown to a non-employee visiting Titan’s frontend.
The API wasn’t linked anywhere on the frontend, so Antares searched Microsoft subdomains and found a separate endpoint that resolved to an Azure Cloud Services host. Its public Swagger file listed four routes:
The Swagger doc specified Azure AD bearer authentication for three of the four routes. The exception was /v2/Query, which also happened to be the one that accepted raw SQL. So naturally, that’s where I started poking.
The query needed a tableName, and Swagger gave no example values. I pulled 2023 snapshots of Titan’s login and privacy pages from the Wayback Machine, and reading the archived Superset configuration recovered 56 table definitions, including a routing value called TestData. The archived Titan interface before the current VPN restriction. I tried that value against the live API: With no authorization header it returned 401 Unauthorized, so Antares started probing how it validated JWTs.
An estimated 17.3 trillion stored rows across a wide range of Microsoft datasets were reachable through a single internal analytics service, all because it never checked the signature on a login token.